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The State Action Antitrust Exemption:
The Confinement of the Parker Doctrine Within the
Emerging Cantor Formula
Since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, business entities
have sought exemption from its operation. A number of exemptions
have been created, several of them sweeping in effect. Some were
created by federal regulatory statutes that expressly limit competition
in the industries to which they apply;' other exemptions have evolved
from judicial interpretations of the antitrust statutes. One of the most
fundamental judicial exemptions was born in the Supreme Court de-
cision in Parker v. Brown.2  Parker developed the "state action exemp-
tion" by holding that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to the states.
Analysis of the judicial interpretation of Parker and its progeny reveals
1. In addition to the federally regulated industries there are express congressional
statutes which create exemptions for organized labor, agriculture, insurance, and certain
export associations. Illustrative of legislation expressly granting exemption from the
scope of the antitrust laws are 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1970) (Capper-Volstead exemp-
tion for agricultural cooperatives); 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1970) (McCarran-Ferguson
exemption for state regulation of insurance); 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970) (Webb-Pomerance
exemption for export trade associations); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) (exempting labor,
agricultural and horticultural associations); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1970) (exempting
state supervision of resale price maintenance).
2. .317 U.S. 341 (1943). Alternative theories to the exemption doctrine of
Parker include state immunity under the eleventh amendment, see Miley v. John Han-
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 242 F.2d
758 (1st Cir. 1957), and the immunity of federal officials acting within the scope of
their designated duties, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
There is also a related doctrine whereby a business entity is exempt from the
application of the antitrust laws if it is compelled to do something anticompetitive
by a foreign sovereign. The same rationale which underlies the Parker decision alsb
provides the basis for this grouping of cases, i.e., if a business entity has been com-
pelled to undertake anticompetitive conduct and not merely authorized to partake
in such activity, then an exemption will be applied. The exemption will not cover
a situation where the foreign sovereign has merely delegated the power to restrain
competition to the business entity. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
A difficult issue which has arisen within this realm of cases is whether ownership
by a foreign power gives a corporation carte blanche to participate in anticompetitive
behavior that disrupts United States competitive markets. In essence, can a govern-
ment by agreement immunize its co-conspirators? Untold diplomatic difficulties arise
when the foreign sovereign considers the activity of the corporation to be "political"
and hence exempt from competitive business regulations, while the United States con-
siders the conduct to be "commercial" and therefore subject to antitrust application.
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considerable refinement of the state action exemption. 3  The Supreme
Court departed from the Parker interpretive trend, however, in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co.4 in July 1976.
Prior to the Cantor decision, Parker traditionally had been cited
for the proposition that both state regulatory agencies and the private
parties under their jurisdiction were exempt from the application of
the federal antitrust laws if their conduct constituted "state action."
The Court in Cantor concluded, however, that the Parker exemption
could be invoked only by the state and did not extend to immunize
the private party, in that case a state-regulated industry. By virtue
of this confinement of Parker, regulated private parties are no longer
protected with the antitrust exemption that had been effective since
1943. Numerous state regulated industries confront a "Hobson's
choice" of either complying with state regulation and thereby sub-
jecting themselves to federal antitrust liability or complying with the
federal antitrust laws at the risk of incurring state regulatory sanction.
Of course, an industry that runs afoul of a state law can raise federal
preemption of the law by way of a defense. Likewise, federal declara-
tory judgment actions are available to establish the duties of a business
entity in light of conflicting laws. Nevertheless, the Cantor decision
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); United
States v. Deutsches Kalisynidikat, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); In re Investigation
of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952); In re Grand Jury Investigation
of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298, 318-20 (D.D.C. 1960). A number of ju-
dicial decisions outside of the antitrust arena have been helpful in drawing the dis-
tinction between the "'political" and "commercial" activities of foreign governments
in relation to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See generally Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Victory Transport, Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
Foreign government interests have created several new problems related to anti-
trust and the exemption issue which will only be resolved through future judicial
decisions. The first problem occurs when a foreign government acts as the director
of a cartel. The second concerns a government giving a monopoly to private sup-
pliers, thus creating a supply shortage. The final problem occurs when a foreign
sovereign attempts to get United States companies to boycott other United States
companies of which the foreign sovereign does not approve for political reasons.
3. The term "exemption" is not used in its technical sense but rather as a term
of antitrust law art to denote any statutory or judicial doctrine which expressly or
impliedly immunizes certain otherwise anticompetitive activities from the operation
of the federal antitrust laws. Technically, the term "exemption" is not correctly used
in Parker and subsequent cases. Parker held that the federal antitrust laws were not
intended to apply to state-sanctioned conduct; the Parker rule is therefore one of
non-applicability rather than exemption. Inasmuch as the commentators and courts
that have considered the Parker doctrine have referred to it as an exemption, how-
ever, this Note adopts the same terminology.
4. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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is likely to cause uncertainty within the business community and among
state policy makers whose jurisdictions may well be circumscribed by
the broad federal antitrust laws.
In ihis Note the apparent problem created by the Cantor decision
will be analyzed within the framework of the state action exemption
doctrine as it has evolved from its inception to the present. The Note
will begin with a detailed discussion of the Parker case and its evolution
through various judicial decisions up to the Cantor case. Next, the
trends within the Cantor court will be analyzed in detail to show how
the state action doctrine has been reformulated. The Note will con-
clude with an assessment of the current status of a judicially created
exemption for states and for regulated private parties.
Parker v. Brown and the State Exemption Doctrine
Although often referred to as the first case to deal with state
mandated anticompetitive activity, Parker was not the first case to
confront the issue of state sanctioned restraints upon competition.
Five years after the enactment of the Sherman Act, in Lowenstein v.
Evans,5 state agents were granted the exclusive right to manufacture
all liquor sold within South Carolina; the result was essentially a state
approved monopoly in the retail liquor industry.6 Suit was brought
by a North Carolina liquor manufacturer whose shipment to South
Carolina had been seized by South Carolina officials. The district
court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the action was brought
against the state itself,7 not against a "person" or "corporation" as
contemplated by section 7 of the Sherman Act.8
Some years later the United States Supreme Court in Olsen v.
Smith9 considered the claim of harbor pilots licensed by the state of
Texas who sought to enjoin an unlicensed pilot service in the port of
Galveston. Although the defendants contended that the licensing
program created a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act, the Court
upheld the system, reasoning:
5. 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895). Other cases prior to Parker which tangen-
tially considered issues relevant to state action exemption were American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (official foreign government action is not
subject to Sherman Act application), and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940) (private antitrust action was allowed against the defendant be-
cause he had failed to follow the explicit method allotted by Congress for obtaining
immunity).
6. 69 F. at 910-11.
7. Id. at 910.
8. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210. Section 7 was repealed and,
in effect, replaced by § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
9. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
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[I]f the State has the power to regulate, and in so doing to appoint
and commission, those who are to perform pilotage services, it
must follow that no monopoly or combination in a legal sense can
arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the State are
alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon them by law.10
The Court stated that the defendants' antitrust contentions, con-
sidered in their "ultimate aspect," amounted simply to an assertion that
the Texas regulations were not void for a lack of proper authority but
rather for injudiciousness. Even assuming such a contention to be
valid, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs' remedy nonetheless was
to be pursued through the legislature. The judiciary, declared the
Court, lacks the authority to abrogate the power of the states to exer-
cise domination with respect to local industries, over which they have
plenary power.1"
The full potential of an antitrust defense to a claim of state regu-
lated anticompetitive activity, however, was not fully realized until
the Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Brown.1 2  Parker arose as
the result of a suit filed by a California raisin producer and packer to
enjoin the state director of agriculture and other state employees from
enforcing a raisin prorate marketing program authorized by the Cali-
fornia Agricultural Prorate Act."a The plaintiff contended that the
California program was invalid to the extent that it conflicted with
the federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act1 4 and violated both
the commerce clause-5 and the Sherman Act. 16
10. Id. at 345.
11. Id. Only four years prior to Parker, the Court considered the issue of fed-
eral action immunity in United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
Federal action cases constitute a completely separate realm of judicially created ex-
emptions from the state action exemption of Parker. Because in federal action cases
the court is concerned with the activities of federal officials, any statements relating
to state activity are only dicta. Much of the underlying economic rationale utilized
by the Parker Court in 1943 was discussed in detail in Rock Royal.
12. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
13. 1933 Cal. Stats. 1969.
14. Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 296, §§ 1-6, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 601-24 (1970).
15. Ninety-five percent of the California raisin crop found its way into interstate
or foreign commerce. 317 U.S. at 345.
16. Parker was originally viewed by the commentators as significant for its inter-
pretation of the commerce clause. The Sherman Act issues were not part of the
plaintiff's original complaint and therefore were not litigated in the trial court. The
trial court predicated its opinion only upon the commerce clause. 39 F. Supp. 895
(S.D. Cal. 1941). When the case came before the Supreme Court, it was the Court,
on its own motion, which requested the Solicitor General of the United States to file
an amicus curiae brief and directed the parties to discuss whether the California statute
was preempted by the Sherman Act. The parties responded with curt contentions
to the Sherman Act question. Conversely, the Solicitor General fully briefed and
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California's comprehensive agricultural program was designed to
permit a majority of growers to elevate commodity prices artificially
and restrict production. Producers were compelled by the act to al-
locate fixed percentages of their raisin crop, part to a stabilization pool
and part to a surplus pool to ensure that bumper raisin crops would
not impair market stability. All raisin producers, moreover, were re-
quired to operate within the confines of the Act in order to enter the
market, and state regulatory sanctions were imposed for violations.
17
The federal district court granted a decree permanently enjoining
the prorate raisin marketing program, but the United States Supreme
Court reversed, categorically dismissing each of the plaintiff's conten-
tions. Although upholding the validity of the raisin program under
the Sherman Act, the Court determined in dicta that the program
would have violated the Sherman Act only if it had been promoted
solely by private persons without state mandate.' The Court further
held that if Congress had so desired, it could have expressly prohibited
such state regulatory plans in the Sherman Act through its power under
the commerce clause. 19 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stone
followed a dual sovereign approach and found no hint that the Sherman
Act was intended to be a restraint either upon state action itself or
upon private activity directed by the state,2 0 he stated:
argued the Sherman issues, concluding that the California statute was in violation
of the Sherman Act; his position was, of course, discounted by the Court.
17. 317 U.S. at 347.
18. Id. at 350.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 351. Prior to the passage of the Sherman Act the congressional debate
was concerned with restrictive practices by individuals and corporations. White,
Participant Governmental Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: Fact or Fiction?,
50 TEx. L. REv. 474, 482 (1972) [hereinafter cited as White]. Congress almost in-
serted specific language concerning state action into the Sherman Act through a pro-
posed amendment by Senator Wilson of Iowa. His amendment would have with-
drawn from the Acet's coverage "any arrangements, agreements, associations, or com-
binations among persons for the enforcement and execution of the laws of any State
enacted in pursuance of its police powers; nor shall this act be held to control or
abridge such powers of the States." 21 CoNG. Ec. 2658 (1890). Wilson inter-
preted this amendment as having a dual purpose: (1) to provide protection to tem-
perance associations promoting the implementation of state prohibition laws and (2)
to provide broad power to the states in the execution of their police powers. White,
supra at 482. Senator Sherman endorsed the bill despite his realization that it had
a broader potential for application than was realized by Wilson, its sponsor. The.
Wilson amendment passed in its original committee but was later eliminated when
the bill was reviewed by another Senate committee. It is possible to- argue predi-
cated upon these facts, that Congress either intended to exempt state action or de-
liberately avoided creating the exemption. Either Congress considered the amend-
ment superfluous and therefore did not burden the already complicated act with un-
necessary sections, or the committee rejected the notion of state exemptions and Cong-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or
its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In
a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify
a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be at-
tributed to Congress. The Sherman Act makes no mention of the
State as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain
state action or official action directed by a state.
2 1
Pursuing this rationale to its logical conclusion, Stone effectively viti-
ated the preemption effect of the Sherman Act with respect to state
sanctioned action.
Because the Court decided in effect that the supremacy clause
was inapplicable in such circumstances and that state economic regu-
lation is therefore simply outside the scope of the Sherman Act, the
important inquiry under Parker is whether the contested activity consti-
tutes "state action" in the settling of each case. The Court's standard
for this determination was whether the private conduct under attack
was "directed,"' 22 "commanded,"'2 3 or "imposed"2 4 by the state. Thus,
a critical factor in Parker was the mandatory nature of the California
raisin prorate marketing program.2 :'  The producers' anticompetitive
ress agreed by not reinstituting the amendment. Rules of construction would usually
favor the latter interpretation. In either case, the Parker Court neither mentioned the
Wilson amendment nor its exclusion from the Act. Rather, the Court interpreted the
broad prohibitions of the Act as not being intended by Congress to cover state action.
21. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
22. Id. at 350.
23. Id. at 352.
24. Id.
25. An article recently published on the state action exemption and the effect
of the Cantor decision is Dorman, State Action Immunity: A Problem Under Cantor v.
Detroit Edison, 27 CASE W.L. REv. 503 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dorman]. Dorman
discusses the development of the Parker doctrine and the changes made by Cantor.
However, the author reaches significantly different conclusions on a number of im-
portant issues from the positions delineated in this Note. References are made to
Dorman at the appropriate sections to indicate the contrary conclusions he has reached
from those in this Note. Although this author believes that a close analysis of the
pertinent cases supports the conclusions arrived at in this Note, reference to Dorman
is important as it serves to show that the state action exemption is a complex area
in which commentators armed with the same cases and information can arrive at
radically different results.
Dorman states that only one thing was clear after the Parker decision: that official
action taken pursuant to state authoriaztion was exempt from antitrust liability. Id.
at 506. He concludes that the prorate raisin program could "in no way" be inter-
preted as state compulsion. Id. at 508. However, in Parker Justice Stone carefully
distinguished between activity which was compelled by the state acting as sovereign
and activity which was merely authorized. See text accompanying notes 45-54, infra.
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activity was compelled by state regulatory mandate.26  Although the
regulatory program had substantial input by private parties, the Court
concluded:
[I]t is the state acting through the Commission, which adopts the
program and which enforces it with penal sanctions in the execu-
tion of a governmental policy.... The state itself exercises its
legislative authority in making the regulation and in prescribing
the conditions of its application.
27
The Parker opinion does, however, include language that appears
to limit the otherwise broad exemption doctrine: "[A] state does not
give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing
them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful."28 Yet,
this language is merely an explicit statement of the distinction the
Court had drawn earlier regarding liability under state authorization
as contrasted with state compulsion. 29  Most of the Sherman Act dis-
cussion established that the Act does not apply to activities compelled
by the state acting as sovereign. In its short disclaimer, the Court held
that mere authorization, as opposed to state mandate, will not exempt
private activity from the Sherman Act.
26. The Parker Court did not consider whether the State legislature ever considered
the anticompetitive effects of its statute or whether the state purposefully adopted a
state regulation in conflict wili federal anitrust legislation. However, the Court did
mention that a significant state benefit was fulfilled by the prorate program: "[T]he
adoption of legislative measures to prevent the demoralization of the industry by sta-
bilizing the marketing of the raisin crop is a matter of state as well as national concern
and . . . is a problem whose solution is peculiarly within the province of the state."
317 U.S. at 367. The Court seemed to indicate that another important factor would
therefore be the question of whether a state interest was at stake. Subsequent cases
did not analyze this factor. Although it has primarily remained inactive, this conten-
tion was part of the Parker rationale and as such constitutes a valid issue for judicial
consideration in state action cases.
27. 317 U.S. at 352.
28. Id. at 351.
29. This language could also be interpreted to be little more than a restatement
of the holding in the 1904 case of Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197 (1904), in which the Court declared: "[N]othing in the record tends to show
that the State of New Jersey had any reason to suspect that those who took advantage
of its liberal incorporation laws had in view, when organizing the Securities Company,
to destroy competition .... No State can, by merely creating a corporation, or in
any other mode, project its authority into other States . . . so as to prevent Congress
from exerting the power it possesses under the Constitution over interstate and inter-
national commerce, or so as to exempt its corporation engaged in interstate commerce
from obedience to any rule lawfully established by Congress for such commerce." Id.
at 345-46.
It is therefore unlikely that the Parker Court attempted to establish any substantive
limitation upon its newly articulated state exemption doctrine. It is more probable,
rather, that the Court was emphasizing that a well-established rule of the antitrust
laws would remain the outer perimeter of its state action exemption doctrine.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Thus, although the Court employs broad language to create the
doctrine, it nonetheless serves notice that unless bona fide "state action"
is involved, merely tangential or token state participation will not serve
to exempt what is essentially private anticompetitive activity. A party
violating the antitrust laws cannot claim an exception based upon the
fact that the state has been only technically involved. 30 Parker there-
fore draws a clear distinction between the anticompetitive activity of
private parties that is only marginally connected with or passively
approved by the state and private activity that is mandated as part of
valid state regulation. The former situation subjects the parties to
antitrust sanctions; the latter constitutes "state action" under Parker
and lies behind the shield.
Therefore, the state exemption doctrine inferred from Parker has
two components. First, the antitrust laws do not apply to the states'
own economic activities. Second, private conduct compelled by state
economic regulation is likewise exempt from the antitrust laws.
The parameters of the state action exemption have been clarified
through interpretation in cases subsequent to Parker.31 Some lower
courts have liberally accepted the Parker doctrine despite the Supreme
Court's repeated statements that the judiciary should not lightly imply
exemptions from the antitrust laws. 32  A detailed analysis of the judi-
cial interpretation of Parker reveals a certain black letter law character
behind the substance of the state action exemption doctrine as it
existed prior to the Cantor decision. Two aspects of this interpretation
particularly require discussion: first, the factors that the courts will
30. This type of technical involvement was the situation in Northern Securities
where the defendants claimed an immunity because they had used the state incor-
poration process and the state had not complained of the questionable activities. Id.
at 344-45.
31. There is no general concurrence on the limits of the Parker doctrine. As
the Fifth Circuit stated in Woods Exploration & Pro. Co. v. Aluminum Co., 438 F.2d
1286, 1294 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972): "The concept of
state action is not susceptible to rigid, bright-line rules. Each case must be con-
sidered on its own facts in order to determine whether or not the anticompetitive
consequence is truly the action of the state." There are definite limits, however, that
have become part of the state action exemption doctrine. This Note defines the limits
and preconditions which subsequent decisions have formulated for the Parker doctrine.
See text accompanying notes 31-62, infra. While some courts have expanded the
exemption's applicability and while others have restricted it, the law on the Parker
doctrine has emerged as surprisingly uniform.
32. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States
v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound
Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962). See
also Note, The Antitrust Immunity Doctrine and United States v. National Association
of Securities Dealers: Stepping on Otter Tail, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 387 (1976).
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consider in determining whether the state action exemption will apply
and second, the scope of any applicable exemption.
A court, engaging in the first aspect of the interpretation, deter-
mines whether an activity constitutes Parker-standard "state action" so
that it is exempt from the application of the federal antitrust laws.
The court's determination depends on four major factors:33 (1) inde-
pendent state participants must have adequately supervised the regu-
latory policy; (2) the appropriate state mechanism must have actively
supervised and regulated the private party; (3) the enabling legislation
must show a clear purpose to displace the antitrust laws in the pursuit
of a specific state objective; and (4) even if the statute or the state
agency directive only authorizes anticompetitive means, the appro-
priate state mechanism must compel the anticompetitive activity.
If the courts determine that the activity in question meets the
criteria above, the state action exemption will be applied, and the
exemption's scope then becomes the all important consideration. The
scope of the Parker doctrine, as expanded by subsequent cases, extends
to the state, its agents and officials and the private parties involved in
an anticompetitive regulatory scheme. This exemption is referred to
as "umbrella immunity."
The following analysis is a detailed view of the major cases formu-
lating the four factors that limit the substance and scope of the Parker
doctrine. Such analysis is the foundation for surveying the extent to
which Cantor is a significant alteration in the traditional state action
exemption.
Independent State Participant Supervision
The rationale that state officials must be active in supervising the
appropriate state regulatory policy was first articulated in Asheville
Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. FTC.3 4  The North Carolina legisla-
ture had enacted a statute permitting tobacco warehousemen to form
local boards of trade with the authority to enact rules to provide for
more efficient tobacco handling and sale.35  Eleven warehousemen
operating in the city of Asheville accordingly formed such a board and
passed rules, sharply curtailing the number of hours in a day when
tobacco could be sold, prohibiting new warehouse construction, and
33. Many courts work with these factors as "preconditions." However, because
some courts do not include all of the elements in reaching their conclusions, the more
generalized term "factor" is utilized in text.
34. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). For a case which is very similar to Asheville
in facts and results, see Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 339 F.2d 281
(6th Cir. 1964). See also Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d
1011 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g 317 F. Supp. 247 (D.V.I. 1970).
35. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 106-465 (1965).
generally otherwise restricting competition. When plaintiff sued in
state court, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the tobacco
board rules as both reasonable"o and consistent with valid state legis-
lation.37 Plaintiff then lodged a complaint with the FTC, which issued
a cease and desist order, declaring the rules to be an unreasonable
restraint of trade.
The tobacco board's appeal, based upon the Parker exemption,
was rejected by the Fourth Circuit, which held that the action of the
board did not constitute state action. The board's rules were, accord-
ing to the court, merely private action masquerading as that of the
state. 38 The court added that to come within the Parker doctrine, a
state program or regulatory agency must be supervised by independent
state officials. 39
The Asheville court was concerned that the members of the
tobacco board were competitors who served inherently conflicting
interests. Commenting on the Parker doctrine, the court utilized
language which would significantly extend the power of states to
regulate:
[T]he teaching of Parker v. Brown is that the antitrust laws
are directed against individual and not state action. When a state
has a public policy against free competition in an industry im-
portant to it, the state may regulate that industry in order to con-
trol or, in a proper case, to eliminate competition therein.
40
36. Day v. Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade Inc., 242 N.C. 136, 144, 87 S.E.2d
18, 24 (1955).
37. Id.
38. 263 F.2d at 509.
39. Id. at 509-10.
40. Id. at 509. A number of subsequent cases reinforced the theory underlying
Asheville. In Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d
248, 251 (4th Cir. 1971), the court stated: "To find shelter under Parker, the acts
complained of must be the result of state action, either by state officials or by private
individuals 'under the active supervision' of the state, Allstate Insurance Company v.
Lanier, 361 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir. 1966), although proposals may originate privately
if their execution depends on state regulation or actual state implementation."
The Fifth Circuit in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Alumnium Co., 438
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), stated: "tIlt is not
every governmental act that points a path to an antitrust shelter. We reject 'the facile
conclusion that action by any public official automatically confers exemption.'" [Ci-
tations omitted. The Court then quoted extensively from Asheville.] Id. at 1294.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to comment on the issue in Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Licensed optometrists employed by Lee Optical
Company who were not members of the Alabama Optometric Association were charged
by the Association with unprofessional conduct within the scope of the state optometry
statute. One of the critical issues in the case became the question of the objectivity
of the Alabama Board of Optometry, with which the origianl complaint had been filed.
The Board was composed entirely of Association members: the defendants charged
that the Board was biased and hence should not have a role in the proceedings. The
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Bona Fide Regulation
In order to constitute valid governmental state action, the function
of the regulatory process must go beyond that of a rubber stamp for
the policy whims of the regulated private parties. Even with the pres-
ence of adequate independent state supervision, a regulatory agency
may fall short of its obligation in this regard.
The Fifth Circuit addressed this criterion in Woods Exploration
& Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co.41  In Woods, both the plaintiff
and the defendant were natural gas producers in the same area, and
both were subject to the same regulatory agency, empowered to set
maximum production quotas for each producer in the field. These
quotas were based upon the various producers' forecasts of the volume
of gas they estimated they would be marketing from their wells. The
commission totaled these forecasts and then applied an allocation for-
mula, weighted to favor those producers with small gas reserves. The
defendants generally had larger reserves, and the plaintiff charged
them with violating the Sherman Act by filing purposefully under-
estimated forecasts in order to reduce the quota given the plaintiff.
The defendants predicated their defense upon the Parker doctrine,
alleging that once their forecasts became part of the commission's
regulatory order, they constituted state action. The Fifth Circuit
denied the defense, stating that the defendant bad been the "real
decisionmaker" because the commission had done no more than to
base its order upon the defendants' falsified forecasts. The court
stated:
[I]n the case at hand there is an allegation that the Commission's
production allowable order rested upon false facts adduced by
the defendants. There was, moreover, no opportunity for mean-
ingful supervision or verification.... Hence, defendants' con-
duct here can in no way be said to have become merged with the
Supreme Court concluded "[t]he District Court determined that the aim of the Board
was to revoke the licenses of all optometrists in the State who were employed by busi-
ness corporations such as Lee Optical, and that these optometrists accounted for nearly
half of all the optometrists practicing in Alabama. Because the Board of Optometry
was composed solely of optometrists in private practice for their own account, the
District Court concluded that success in the Board's efforts would possibly redound
to the personal benefit of members of the Board, sufficiently so that in the opinion
of the District Court the Board was constitutionally disqualified from hearing the
charges filed .... [W]e affirm .... It is sufficiently clear from our cases that those
with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these
disputes.... It has also come to be the prevailing view that '[m]ost of the law con-
cerning disqualification because of interest applies with equal force to . . . administra-
tive adjudicators."' Id. at 578-79.
See also Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noeir-Pennington Defense,
66 MicH. L. REv. 333, 340-43 (1967).
41. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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Legislative Authorization of Anticompetitive Means
When the state creates a regulatory agency, most courts have
required that the statute generally authorize anticompetitive activity
if the agency is to come within the scope of the state action exemption.
42. 438 F.2d at 1295. Accord, Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (1971) where the Fourth Circuit concluded: "If the exemp-
tion is to be applied to a regulated industry, such as a state utility, then it can extend
only to those activities which fall under state supervision .... The regulatory agency
must be a creature of the state and not one whose actviities are governed by private
agreement without any real state control." Id. at 251 (citation omitted). Similarly
in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d (1st Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), the First Circuit stated: "An anticompeti-
tive practice may receive only the most cursory inspection by public officials . . . or
public officials may approve conduct without consideration or awareness of its anti-
competitive aspects. . . . The issue in such cases is not whether the action was in
form 'governmental' but whether the real decision makers were public officials or pri-
vate businessmen." Id. at 33 n.8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
See Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971).
In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), a
foreign action case, the Supreme Court predicated its denial of the Parker exemption
upon the fact that there was no evidence that the government had actively approved
the conduct of the regulated party.
In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), the Court, in dicta, presented analysis which concerns itself with the issue
of bona fide agency regulation: "[T]he Sherman Act forbids only those trade restraints
and monopolizations that are created, or attempted, by the acts of 'individuals or
combinations of individuals or corporations.' Accordingly, it has been held that where
a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action,
as opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be made out." Id. at 135-
36 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). It is the concept of "valid governmental
action" which the courts must attempt to define as one of the factors comprising the
state action exemption. It is important to note that the broad statement from Noerr
may no longer be simply dicta. In California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlim-
ited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, said that the
Noerr Court had "held" that the lobbying immunity "was a corollary of our decisions
in Rock Royal . . . and Parker . . . [which held] that when a monopoly or restraint
of trade is the result of valid governmental action, there cannot be an antitrust viola-
tion." Id. at 516 n.3 (citations omitted). This language tends to reinforce the con-
cept that the activity of the state agency must constitute bona fide regulation and
not just automatic approval.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, D.C., 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 930 (1966), the state statute not only created the North Carolina Automobile
Rate Administrative Office and provided for its regulation by the State Insurance Com-
missioner but also expressly authorized price fixing. This is a rare case because of
the express anticompetitive sanction; most other statutes do not, and need not, con-
tain such specific provisions.
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Although it is not necessary under this criterion that the statute speci-
fically list any and all anticompetitive actions that the agency could
conceivably order, the legislation nonetheless must be sufficiently par-
ticular so that it can be interpreted to permit the challenged anticom-
petitive practices in the fulfillment of the state regulatory policy. The
courts have generally been lenient in upholding pervasive statutes,
worded in broad terms, to satisfy this requirement.
The proposition was treated at length by the First Circuit in
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.43  In that
case a swimming pool builder tried to convince an architect hired by
a school board to adopt bid specifications for a proposed pool to which
competing builders could not conform. The defendant contractor
argued that he could not be held liable for inducing an agent of the
school board to undertake valid, albeit anticompetitive, state action
within the meaning of Parker. The district court held that the de-
fendant was not covered by the Parker exemption. The government
agency itself was the only proper decisionmaker under the relevant
competitive bidding statute, and the defendant could not usurp its
power by inducing the board's agent to adopt bid specifications only
the defendant could satisfy. The court in applying Parker reasoned
that "valid government action confers antitrust immunity only when
government determines that competition is not the summum bonum
in a particular field and deliberately attempts to provide an alternate
form of ptiblic regulation." 44
43. 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
44. Id. at 30. See also Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop., 394 F.2d
672 (5th Cir. 1968); Independent Taxicab Operators' Ass'n v. Yellow Cab Co., 278
F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F.
Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1957).
The Whitten rationale had first been articulated several years earlier in Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969), in which the district
court stated: "[WIhere a 'state action' exclusion from the scope of the Sherman Act
has been sanctioned by the courts, a particular pattern emerges from the statute under
which such action is taken. Not only does the legislature create the entity involved
or endow it with governmental character, but it also directs and authorizes that entity
by means of the same statute to utilize anticompetitive means to achieve a specific
governmental purpose. For example, in Parker v. Brown . .. the California legis-
lature not only created raisin districts but authorized them to limit production arti-
ficially in order to correct adverse market conditions. Such behavior, if manifested
without government direction, would be contrary to federal antitrust legislation." Id.
at 1111-12 (citations omitted). Accord. Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev.
Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970), where the court concluded: "[I]t appears that
the proposition'is settled that the antitrust laws do not apply to state government or
activities undertaken pursuant to legislative mandate. . . . [T]he antitrust laws do
not apply, whether the operation is labeled proprietary or governmental. . . . We
deem it well settled that when a state announces a public policy against free com-
petition in an industry essential to it, state control and regulation of that industry,
By thus requiring that anticompetitive conduct be expressly au-
thorized by the enabling legislation, the courts have created an im-
portant factor in determining whether there is state action for purposes
of a Parker exemption. However, the courts do not require the specific
statutory intent which must be evidenced as part of the federal im-
munity cases. Therefore, this requirement of the state action test
has been relatively simple to satisfy. The legislature must, in effect,
merely decide that the state agency can legitimately enforce public
policies which it determines to be ultimately more beneficial than that
of free competition.
Agency Compulsion
Clearly one of the critical factors in Parker was the mandatory
nature of the California legislation: a raisin producer who wanted to
market his crop was compelled to adhere to the terms of the prorate
program. 45  Numerous courts which have since considered claims for
state action exemption have accordingly placed great emphasis upon
whether the anticompetitive activity at issue was thus compelled by
the state agency or whether it was merely authorized. The criterion
goes beyond the threshold issue of whether the anticompetitive con-
duct falls within the scope of a state law. Even if the statute does in
fact authorize the conduct, the courts nonetheless generally refuse to
recognize an exemption unless the appropriate state agency has also
utilized its statutory authority to compel anticompetitive behavior.
A recent United States Supreme Court statement in this regard
even to the extent of eliminating competition, is permissible." Id. at 135, 137. See
E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Schenley Indus. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit
Wholesalers Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1967) (defendants improperly sought
to invoke a state statute requiring independent vertical price fixing to protect an al-
leged horizontal price fixing scheme). For a restrictive interpretation of a legisla-
tive statute, see Mamell v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal.
1966), wherein the court refused to find the necessary legislative authorization when
the statute involved was "one of general supervision rather than one of specific direc-
tion." Id. at 409. See generally, Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), a federal action immunity case where
the court not only refused to find any statutory authorization but suggested in dicta,
inter alia, that the proper inquiry in state action cases is "to what extent ... the state
action [is] permissible as not contravening the federal antitrust laws.... '".Id. at
935.
Finally, it should be noted that the Court in Parker did not undertake an inquiry
to determine whether California considered the anticompetitive ramifications of its
legislation and thereby made a deliberate effort to substitute state regulation for the
federal antitrust laws. This factor of authorization granted by the enabling statute
has, therefore, exclusively been developed through subsequent court decisions.
45. 317 U.S. 341, 347 (1943).
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is Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,46 in which the Court faced the issue
of whether price fixing practices by the defendants were "required"
by the state. A minimum fee schedule for real estate title searches
had been published by the defendant Fairfax County Bar Association
and had been enforced by the defendant Virginia State Bar. Plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief and damages, charging that the minimum fee
schedule constituted price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. The
defendant associations contended that they were exempt under Parker.
The Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision for the
defendants, holding that neither the Virginia Supreme Court nor any
Virginia statute required the activity in question.47  Although the de-
fendant raised the issue of the State Bar's power to publish ethical
opinions as a means of enforcing the fee schedules, the Court found
that this power did not constitute state supreme court approval 48 and
consequently state compulsion. The Court summarized the rationale
underlying its opinion in its statement that "it is not enough that...
anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather anticom-
petitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting
as sovereign."49 Goldfarb is essentially a reinforcement of the doc-
trine of compulsion which has been a critical factor in cases since
Parker.50
46. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
47. Id. at 790.
48. Id. at 791.
49. Id. Goldfarb explicitly stated that compulsion had always been an integral
part of the state action test. However, Dorman's conclusion that Goldfarb is a sig-
nificant restriction of the state action test is partially based upon his interpretation of
Parker. Dorman, supra note 25, at 508. Because he views Parker as requiring mere
authorization in order to invoke the exemption, he therefore views the language in
Goldfarb concerning compulsion to be a significant restriction. Yet, as the above
analysis of Parker and subsequent cases evidenced, compulsion had always been an
inherent part of the state action test, and Goldfarb merely stated this as an observation.
50. An earlier Supreme Court decision which is concerned with the same issue is
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Schwegmann
centered around the 1937 Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act, which
provided for an antitrust exemption for state fair trade laws. Louisiana permitted
fair trade agreements and declared its nonsignor clauses enforceable. These clauses
permitted the enforcement of resale price maintenance agreements between whole-
salers and retailers with the signature of just one retailer. Two distributors sought
to enjoin a nonsigning retailer for selling below the fair trade contract price, and the
retailer in turn predicated his defense upon the Sherman Act. In a plurality opinion
written by Justice Douglas, the Court held that the nonsignor clauses were prohibited
by the Sherman Act to the extent that the arrangements were not expressly exempted
by the Miller-Tydings Amendment. Id. at 386-87.
There was no state compulsion from which the Court could apply the Parker
exemption. The anticompetitive conduct (use of the nonsignor clauses) was initiated
at the wholesale level where the minimum resale price agreement was first formulated.
At this functional level, the state's position was both neutral and uninvolved. Lou-
There is a minority position on the importance of the compulsion
factor. Some courts, commencing with Washington Gas Light Co.
v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,51 have held that state compulsion
need not be shown and that authorization alone will trigger the Parker
exemption. In Washington Gas, the defendant electric company had
instituted a program under which it waived fees for installing power
lines and gave rebates to residential developers who agreed to install
electric appliances and utilities. The Washington Gas Company was
losing business as a result of this program and brought suit charging
both an illegal tying arrangement and an illegal exclusive dealing pro-
gram. The defendant electric company, relying on Parker, asserted
that the State Corporation Commission (SCC) had the exclusive statu-
tory authority to supervise public utilities and to prohibit anticompeti-
tive activities. The SCC had in fact neither investigated, approved,
nor disapproved the practices at issue. The court nonetheless held
that because the SCC could have prevented the activities in question,
its failure to do so constituted implied consent sufficient to justify a
Parker exemption. The Fourth Circuit thus extended the state action
exemption doctrine to cover private anticompetitive action neither
compelled nor approved by the state and thereby introduced a new
factor into the Parker calculus: potential state regulatory control. The
court stated that it was reasonable to assume that silence by the reg-
ulatory commission could be inferred to be commission approval.
Because the commission had the power to stop the activity, and did
not use that power, the court assumed that the commission had no
objection.52
The practices under attack in Washington Gas were not required
by either the state or the regulatory agency; the SCC was not the ul-
timate decisionmaker in this case; the defendant had full discretion in
establishing the rate practices in question; and finally the defendant
had a past record of participating in anticompetitive schemes,53 yet
isiana law merely permitted wholesale suppliers to integrate nonsignor clauses into
their contracts; there was no state compulsion to include such clauses as a condition
of doing business in the state.
There is another possible explanation of the Schwegmann result which is not
based upon the compulsion doctrine. This latter view contends that the state statute
exceeded the permissible exemption of the Miller-Tydings Amendment from the anti-
trust laws. In essence, that federal antitrust law superseded the state regulatory stat-
ute and functions.
51. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); see Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co.,
440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062, rehearing denied, 405 U.S.
969 (1972); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 930 (1966).
52. 438 F.2d at 252.
53. The defendant had proposed discount plans for three consecutive years; these
were denied by the SCC. In addition, various promotional schemes which were
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despite this weak factual basis the court granted an exemption. There-
fore, Washington Gas is perhaps best regarded as a maverick extension
of the state action exemption doctrine. Numerous courts presented
with facts which could have embraced the Washington Gas rationale
have not. adopted its reasoning.54  The majority of courts apparently
will continue to require that the anticompetitive activity be compelled,
not merely authorized, by the state agency.55
Scope of the Exemption
When a court determines that the foregoing four criteria are satis-
fied and that the exemption therefore applies, the court must then
determine the permissible boundaries delineating its application. The
scope of the Parker doctrine has been judicially developed to exempt
similar to those involved in this case were also rejected by the SCC after a full in-
vestigation as not being in the public interest. The defendant accomplished its de-
sired results, which had previously been rejected by the SCC, by making minor modi-
fications in instituting the programs. However, there is little reason to infer that the
agency had now changed its opinion and was approving this activity through its si-
lence. 438 F.2d at 250.
54. For cases which articulate the compulsion standard, as opposed to the Wash-
ington Gas rationale, see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Norman's on the Water-
front, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971); Macom Prod. Corp. v. Amer-
ican Tel. & Tel. Co., 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Marnell v. United Parcel
Serv., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
In the federal courts it has long been held that unexercised regulatory power
does not grant an exemption from the antitrust laws to those potentially regulated.
See, e.g., Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960);
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). See also International Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1203 n.129 (D. Hawaii 1972)
(Washington Gas "an unwarranted hyperextension of ParkeF'); see generally Note,
Noerr-Pennington and Parker Defenses Inapplicable to Filing of False Information with
State Regulatory Commissions, 46 TuL. L. REv. 526, 530 n.29 (1972); Note, State-
Regulated Industries - Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,
13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229, 230-31 (1971).
55. A serious shortcoming of the traditional Parker test had been its intermingling
of exemption and preemption questions; they are and should be separate and distinct
issues. Cantor, in section III of the opinion, tries to draw the distinctions between
these two different tests. 428 U.S. at 592-98. Interestingly, Dorman concludes that
the Cantor Court has accomplished exactly the opposite result when he states, "One
of the most dramati6 facets of Cantor has been the infusion of preemption concepts
directly into the immunity concepts." Dorman supra, note 25, at 513. Even if this
were a correct appraisal of Cantor, it would fall short of this statement because nu-
merous cases interpreting Parker had liberally intermingled the concepts of immunity
and preemption. Rather, the dramatic facet of the case occurs because the Court
is attempting to address these two issues on independent bases. The fact that the
Court talks of both issues within the same section of the opinion does not support
the interpretation of a unification of these two concepts.
the state and its agencies and employees that originate or participate
in anticompetitive regulatory programs, and the regulated private
parties.
State Exemption
The Parker Court expressly stated that the Sherman Act was never
intended to apply to the states: 5
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in
the [Sherman] Act's legislative history ...
.. . [T]he California Prorate Act is not rendered unlawful
by the Sherman Act since, in view of the latter's words and history,
it must be taken to be a prohibition of individual and not state
action.5
7
Subsequent cases, including Cantor, have reinforced this aspect of the
exemption's scope.
58
The Parker Court also extended the scope of the exemption to
cover agents of the state. In discussing the validity of the California
prorate program under the Sherman Act, Chief Justice Stone declared
that there was no indication in the language of the Sherman Act that
was intended to be a restraint upon the states.59 The Court included
regulatory agencies created by the legislature and found such agencies
to be comprised of their "officers" and "agents." This interpretation
brings state agencies within the ambit of the state action exemption. 0
Private Party Exemption
Private parties were not sued as such in Parker, but an exemption
for private parties was implicit in the Court's use of the term "state
action."61 While the Parker Court did not expressly define the term
"state action," subsequent cases have interpreted the term to include
regulated private parties.
62
56. 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
57. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
59. See note 21 supra.
60. Accord, Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th
Cir. 1970); E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
61. Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and the Antitrust Laws: Effect
of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 46 Nw. U.L. REv. 349, 364-65
(1951).
62. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Vir-
ginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); Sun Valley Disposal Co. v.
Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969); E. W. Wiggins Airways,
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Summary
In order to decide whether to exempt challenged activity from
the federal antitrust laws under the state action exemption doctrine,
the courts will consider some or all of the following factors: (1) wheth-
er independent state participants, as opposed to private parties with
vested interests, are adequately supervising the regulatory process; (2)
whether there is active agency regulation; (3) whether the enabling
legislation evidences a purpose to displace the antitrust laws in the
pursuit of a specific state objective; and (4) whether the agency has
compelled the questioned activity. If the above considerations are
satisfied by the facts of a given case, the court will generally extend
the state action exemption to the state, its agents, its employees, and
the regulated private parties who have been sued under the antitrust
laws.
This complex framework has been profoundly- affected by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.63 Cantor
assumes special importance because numerous statements in the de-
cision make drastic departures from the well-established principles of
the Parker doctrine.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.
The defendant electric company in Cantor supplied electricity for
nearly five million people in southeastern Michigan and had instituted
a program to provide light bulbs to its customers without additional
charge.64  In 1972, under the program the defendant had supplied
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947
(1966). See also Heath v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 325 F. Supp. 223, 232 (D. Colo.
1971), where the court applied the state exemption rationale, including the "valid
government action" statement, to federal governmental action.
Private parties will not be covered by the Parker exemption if they are not part
of activities which comprise state action, and hence the regulated private parties are
open to antitrust liability. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co.,
438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (use of false
facts); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (misrepresentation of information).
63. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
64. Under this program, new residential customers were provided with bulbs in
unlimited quantities for their permanent fixtures. Thereafter, the defendant replaced
bulbs in proportion to the residential customer's estimated consumption of electricity.
The customer did not pay any charge for such replacement bulbs but usually turned
in any burned out bulbs in order to obtain new ones. The defendant supplied cus-
tomers with nearly 50% of the most frequently used standard light bulbs. The de-
fendant did not distribute fluorescent lights or bulbs of high intensity lamps. If these
varieties of bulbs were included, the defendant's share of the relative market would
be approximately twenty-three percent. Id. at 582-83.
residential usersG5 with 18,564,381 bulbs at a cost of $2,835,000;06 the
additional expense occasioned had been included in the company's
annual service accounting. Technically, no profit had been realized
from the program, the primary purpose of which was simply to increase
electricity consumption. 67 This program had originated in 1886, prior
to state electric utility regulation.8 In 1916, the Michigan Public
Service Commission first gave its approval to the defendant's utilities
policy, which included the bulb program. Since that date, periodic
commission approval of the utility's general tariff proposals had implied
commission approval of the free bulb program as well. Once a tar-
iff had been approved by the commission, the defendant was bound
to continue its appended bulb program at least until the next tariff
review.69
The owner of a drug store that sold light bulbs brought an anti-
trust action charging that the defendant's free bulb program violated
the antitrust laws by injuring him in his business. The defendant
attempted to invoke the Parker exemption, asserting that its bulb pro-
gram was wholly a creature of state regulation. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant, ° and the court of ap-
peals affirmed.-I However, the United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that is is not inconsistent with Parker to require that a pub-
65. At the time the suit was filed, mainly residential users were being serviced
under this program. In 1964 the state commission had approved the defendant's de-
cision to eliminate the program for large commercial customers. There appeared to
be less interest for the program among the larger commercial customers because they
primarily utilized large quantities of fluorescent lighting. Id. at 583.
66. From this amount, $2,363,328 was paid to the three primary manufacturers
of bulbs from whom the defendant purchased. The remaining $471,672 represented
the overhead costs in administering the program on a continual basis. Id.
67. Id. at 583-84.
68. Id. at 583. See P.A. 1909, No. 106, §§ 1-9 in 26 MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 460.551-460.559. The defendant's brief stated that the Commission's function
is to regulate the "'furnishing . . . [of] electricity for the production of light, heat or
power .... .' Brief for Respondent at 11, quoted in 428 U.S. at 584.
69. Dorman reaches the conclusion that Detroit Edison's conduct was required
by the state; he states that the traditional Parker exemption was not granted because
the utility had primarily initiated the regulatory program. Dorman, supra note 25,
at 516. It should be noted, however, that the state merely authorized the continued
use of a program which had been instituted by Detroit Edison prior to the establish-
ment of the regulatory commission. It is arguable that this form of rubber stamping
would not have satisfied the compulsion standards under the traditional Parker analysis.
The Michigan regulatory commission never held full hearings on the merits of the
bulb program. The incidental approval of the bulb program, as a result of the com-
mission's approval of the entire tariff proposals, did not amount to state-mandated
activity.
70. 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
71. 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975).
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lic utility comply both with state regulations and with the federal
antitrust laws.7
2
The Cantor decision is divided into four sections. Section I is
a recitation of the facts. In section II, a plurality of the Court confines
Parker to its facts as an exemption only of the state and not of regu-
lated private parties. Then section III discusses the possible rationales
which could support an exemption of private parties from the antitrust
laws, which should be called a "Cantor exemption" because the Court
now confines Parker's application only to the state. The Court gives
two possible justifications which might support such an exemption un-
der the proper fact situation but finds that the Cantor case does not
offer such facts. The two justifications discused by the Court are
essentially the underlying bases long used by lower courts to extend
the Parker exemption to private parties: first, if a private party is com-
pelled to act by the state, and second, if Congress did not intend the
antitrust laws to apply.
At the end of section III the Court declares that the state action
test includes a factor that, according to it, was always present in the
Parker doctrine: that the exemption will be granted only to "the mini-
mum extent necessary" to make the regulatory program work. Such
"minimum extent" analysis is not unprecedented. Federal courts have
employed it as a part of the federal immunity test in deciding whether
a federal regulatory program and the federal antitrust laws conflict.
In such cases the federal courts will grant an exemption only if it is
absolutely necessary to make the regulatory program work and even
then only to the "minimum extent necessary." This section of Cantor
indicates that the state action test should be similar to, if not the same
as, the federal immunity test. The use of the federal immunity test
affects only the issue of whether a regulatory policy will be preempted
by the federal antitrust laws; it does not affect the issue of an exemption
for a private party subject to the control of the regulatory program.
These issues are mutually exclusive .73
72. 428 U.S. at 594.
73. Because Dorman has intermingled the exemption and preemption issues, he
does not recognize the institution of a standard that represents the federal immunity
test and the minimum extent analysis. Dorman views the language at the end of
section III as merely adding to the exemption standard which is being prospectively
developed in section III. Dorman, supra note 25, at 518. By disregarding the Court's
language in this part of the opinion, Dorman has de-emphasized the major current
change effected by Cantor. This section is the only substantive majority section, and
it created only one new element to the state action test. This element deals with
the preemption issue of state regulations, and for these questions, Cantor indicates
that the courts should use tests similar to the federal immunity test and the minimum
extent analysis. This is part of the attempt by Justice Stevens to separate the ex-
emption and preemption issues which had been confused in cases prior to Cantor.
Finally, in section IV, another plurality section, the Court looks
at two reasons which arguably could support an exemption from treble
damage liability. The Court tersely rejects the rationales as insufficient.
Thus, the principal opinion in Cantor holds: (1) Parker does not
extend to individual action; (2) yet, there might be some reasons for
such an exemption; (3) two possible reasons could support an exemp-
tion, but neither is found in the Cantor facts; and (4) two reasons that
the Court examined will not support immunity from treble damages.
Within the discussion of possible reasons for an exemption the Court
suggests, in dictum, that if such a private exemption is adopted by the
Court in the future, it will include the federal balancing approach and
the minimum extent analysis of the federal immunity test.
What is the effect of Cantor? First, Parker's scope is narrowed
from its traditional exemption of the state and some private parties to
exemption limited to the state. Second, Cantor recognizes that there
may be reasons to establish a judicial exemption for private parties,
who are no longer covered by the now modified Parker doctrine. Yet
the Court declines to apply a new exemption to the facts in Cantor.
The Court has abrogated the old exemption without defining a new
exemption, wiping the slate clean and freeing itself to write the new
exemption with whatever terms it chooses in the future. However,
the Court hints that a prospective exemption for private parties will
resemble the federal immunity test, including the limitation that the
exemption apply only to the minimum extent necessary to make the
regulatory act work. This exemption seems narrower than the one
which had been recognized in Parker cases.
While each section of the opinion will be analyzed in detail, it
is important to note that two Justices did not join in section II, the
confinement of Parker, and in section IV, the outright rejection of two
possible reasons for treble damage immunity. Literally, this lack of
a constant majority means that the traditional Parker exemption is not
firmly abrogated because the section of Cantor purporting to do so
commanded only a plurality. Yet the next section sketched new rules
for the exemption of private parties and garnered six votes. Whether
the case is treated as a modification of the traditional Parker exemption
or as preparation for a new Cantor exemption, it is an omen of new
rules to come. This Note will examine how much latitude the Court
has given itself and what signposts it has set up in an effort to guide
the shape of these new rules.
Although sections of the opinion commanded only a plurality, the
momentum of the Court toward creation of new rules is demonstrated
by the minor differences of the concurring opinions. The Chief Jus-
tice did not join in these plurality sections for what appears to be his
misinterpretation of the principal opinion. Justice Blackmun did not
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concur in these sections because of minor disagreements; as will be
developed later, he shares the same philosophical viewpoint as the
plurality. Both concurring opinions will be analyzed in detail.
The Confinement of Parker
In section II of the opinion,7 4 a plurality of the Court adopted the
position that Parker granted an exemption to the state only. There-
fore, private activity pursuant to state regulation should not be afforded
the umbrella immunity which has traditionally been granted it since
1943.75
The plurality begins by noting that only state officials were sued
in Parker.76 Because no private parties were included in the original
action, the opinion reasons that any Parker language concerning the
liability of private individuals was only dicta. Relying upon the briefs
submitted in Parker by the California Attorney General and the United
States Solicitor General, the plurality declares that the issue was limited
to whether the state could be liable under the federal antitrust laws
and not whether regulated private parties fell within the scope of the
Sherman Act.77  The opinion notes that the narrow holding in Parker
made it unnecessary for the Parker Court to decide whether the anti-
trust laws applied to private action compelled by the state.78 The
plurality concedes that the term "state action" has been used broadly
in civil rights cases to encompass individual action 0 but that this broad
74. 428 U.S. at 585-92.
75. See text accompanying notes 11-26 supra.
76. The State Director of Agriculture and a number of state employees were sued
in order to stop their enforcement of the California prorate program. 428 U.S. at
585-86.
77. Id. at 587-89. The plurality analyzed the briefs submitted by the California
Attorney General and the United States Solicitor General in order to demonstrate that
Parker had not been concerned with umbrella immunity. The plurality adopted the
contention of the California Attorney General that Congress never intended to subject
a sovereign state to the scope of the Sherman Act. Id. at 591. Analysis of the sub-
stantive arguments therein, however, reveals that the position actually taken by the
California Attorney General was that the California statute in particular was not pre-
empted by the Sherman Act and not that a sovereign state is exempt per se from its
application. California argued that the Sherman Act was not intended to preempt
state regulation of intrastate commerce.
The plurality opinion contends that the Solicitor General did not at the time take
issue with California's first argument and, quoting from the Solictor General's brief,
comes to the conclusion that there is therefore a distinction between state action itself
and "private action taken pursuant to a state statute permitting or requiring individ-
uals to engage in conduct prohibited by the Sherman Act." The plurality then de-
clares this issue to be the sole one resolved by Parker. Id. at 588-89.
78. Id. at 590.
79. The Court acknowledges that such a broad usage is found in civil rights
litigation. Id.
meaning was not intended by Justice Stone.80 Analyzing the thirteen
references to state action by Justice Stone in Parker, the plurality con-
cludes that the language which Stone employed was carefully selected
to cover official action only and not to cover private action compelled
or authorized by the state.8' The plurality completes its discussion in
section II by noting that the Cantor case is opposite to Parker in rela-
tion to the type of party being sued. In Cantor a public utility was
being sued, and no charge was made against any state official; while
in Parker, state agents were the object of the court action, and there
was no claim concerning private parties. As a result the plurality
opinion concludes that Parker does not control because Cantor does
not involve the question of the legality of the conduct of the soverign
state nor any of its officials.8
2
The plurality has significantly narrowed the scope of the Parker
doctrine as it had been applied; the effect Parker will have in future
state action cases has been radically altered as a result. If a regulated
private party is sued under the federal antitrust laws, the courts will
no longer apply the four Parker factors to determine whether an ex-
emption applies because there is no Parker exemption for private
parties. On the other hand, if the state or its agents are sued, Parker
automatically applies, and the federal antitrust laws are inapplicable.
Parker, therefore, has been limited to stand for the barren propo-
sition that the Sherman Act was never meant to apply to the states.
If the Supreme Court in Cantor had concluded its opinion at this point,
the realm of state action cases would be clearly defined in terms of
nonliability for the state or its agents and potential liability for the
regulated private parties; no express statutory exemption nor any judi-
cial exemption would have existed for the benefit of the regulated
private parties. However, the Supreme Court did not end its opinion
there; instead, the Court suggested the possibility of a new judicial
exemption, a Cantor exemption, which could apply to regulated private
parties.
Rationales for a Private Party Exemption
In section III of the opinion,sa a majority section, the Supreme
Court discusses two possible rationales for the existence of a private
party exemption. First, if a private party has done nothing more than
obey the command of the sovereign state, it would be "unjust" to hold
him liable for an antitrust violation (the state compulsion rationale).
Second, if a state regulates an area of the economy, it is possible that
80. Id. at 590-91.
81. Id. at 591 n.24.
82. Id. at 591-92.
83. Id. at 592-93.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
September 1977] THE STATE ACTION ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 235
Congress did not intend to apply the antitrust laws as an "additional,
.and perhaps conflicting, regulatory mechanism"8 4 (the congressional
intent rationale). These reasons have been the implicit rationales
supporting lower court extensions of Parker in the past.
In relation to the state compulsion justification, the courts have
considered whether a private party was compelled to undertake the
anticompetitive conduct as the result of state mandate; if this were the
situation, the exemption would apply. However, if a private party
were merely authorized to participate in anticompetitive activity, the
Parker doctrine would not afford an exemption from federal antitrust
liability. The courts had developed a number of factors which served
as the basis for determining the degree of state compulsion present
in a given set of facts, for example, whether there were independent
state officials who had actively regulated and mandated the contested
activity.85
In regard to the congressional intent justification, the courts often
granted an exemption if the enabling legislation for the challenged
conduct evidenced an intent to substitute state regulation for open
competition.8" In effect, courts under Parker intermingled preemp-
tion questions concerning the validity of state regulatory programs as
against the federal antitrust laws with the questions relating to the
private party exemption. These issues should be kept separate; Cantor
suggests that this separation is important. The only connection be-
tween these issues is that the court cannot grant an exemption greater
than the "minimum extent" necessary. 7
The Cantor Court in section II struck down the traditional Parker
umbrella immunity, which had been based on these two rationales.
Then in section III, the Court suggests that a new exemption which
is based on the same two rationales may be valid.
First, Cantor considers state compulsion, the situation in which
the private party merely obeys the command of the state. The Court
states that in such cases it would be unacceptable to impose antitrust
liability. The Court acknowledges, however, that most cases involve
a mixture of state and private decisionmaking and give rise to difficult
exemption issues. In this respect the majority states: "The Court has
already decided that the state authorization, approval, encouragement,
or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust im-
munity."88 In this sentencie Cantor adopts the same position which
had been developed through two of the Parker factors: that the state
84. Id. at 592.
85. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
87. 428 U.S. at 596-97.
88. Id. at 592-93 (citations omitted).
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actively regulate and supervise the private party and that in the course
of this regulation and supervision, the state compel the private party
to undertake anticompetitive activity. However, instead of restating
the exemption in traditional Parker terminology, the Court substitutes
a new factor:
In each case, notwithstanding the state participation in the deci-
sion, the private party exercised sufficient freedom of choice to
enable the Court to conclude that he should be held responsible
for the consequences of his decision.89
The majority then applies this standard prospectively to the facts
in Cantor and finds that the private utility significantly participated
in the implementation and continuation of the bulb program and there-
fore could incur liability. The Court points out that although Detroit
Edison could neither maintain nor terminate the program without prior
commission approval, the choice to implement the program was "pri-
marily respondent's [Detroit Edison], not the Commission's."90  The
majority noted that the program had been instituted even prior to the
existence of the regulatory commission, at the sole discretion of the
private utility. Regarding the significant role of the utility, the Court
concludes:
[E]ven though there may be cases in which the State's participa-
tion in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to bold a
private party responsible for his conduct in implementing it, this
record discloses no such unfairness."'
In the first part of section III the Court offers a reason for creating
a new exemption, then establishes a framework to apply the exemption,
but decides that the exemption is not supported by the facts of Cantor.
Because the Court did not exempt Detroit Edison under the state
compulsion rationale, a new exemption has not been formally created
to fill the vacuum left by the confinement of Parker. By preparing the
framework, whether the private party exercised sufficient freedom of
choice so as to be responsible for the consequences of his decision,
Cantor had indicated the form of the exemption if and when the Court
decides to apply it.
92
89. Id. at 593.
90. Id. at 594.
91. Id. at 594-95.
92. Another interpretation of the state compulsion rationale is provided by Dor-
man, who views the State Compulsion rationale as merely the first step in a four-part
test which he draws out of the Cantor decision. Dorman, supra note 25, at 514-15.
The basis of this interpretation is the intermingling of the exemption and preemption
issues. Dorman therefore concludes that all of these varied issues combine into a
"four factor test." Dorman, supra note 25, at 520. This analysis appears to be the
one that the Cantor Court hopes to eliminate. The clear division of Justice Steven's
discussion in section III indicates that the State Compulsion rationale is a separate
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In the remaining portion of section III, the majority considers
the congressional intent justification for exempting regulated private
parties. For three distinct reasons, the Court rejects the contention
that the antitrust laws should never apply in segments of the economy
regulated by state agencies. First, state regulatory policies and the
federal antitrust laws do not have necessarily inconsistent standards.
Second, even if an inconsistency existed, there is no reason for the
federal interests in preserving competition to be subordinated to the
state's interest in regulation. Finally, even if Congress did not intend
to superimpose the antitrust laws in areas of the economy pervasively
regulated by the state, that congressional intent would not prohibit the
application of the antitrust laws in an "essentially unregulated area
such as the market for electric light bulbs."93
To support the point that federal antitrust laws and state regula-
tory statutes are not necessarily inconsistent, the Court notes numerous
examples of economic regulations that do not limit open competition.
For example, in the area of public utility regulation, the Court assumes
that the private companies will eventually adopt a monopolist position
and that state regulatory controls are needed to protect the consumer
from monopolistic abuses. The Cantor majority finds no inconsistency
in a private utility's liability under the antitrust laws insofar as it is
participating within the competitive segments of the economy but
being exempt from liability when regulated in the use of its natu-
ral monopoly powers. Detroit Edison must satisfy the state commis-
sion when distributing electricity, but the light bulb program which
constitutes participation in a competitive market must satisfy the
antitrust laws.9 4  Cantor could have ended its discussion at this point
because the standards were not inconsistent. Instead, the Court com-
pleted its discussion of the form a new state action exemption could
assume.
Even if the federal antitrust and state regulatory standaids were
inconsistent, the Court finds no reason automatically to defer to the
state regulatory policies. The Court points out that policies adopted
by federal regulatory agencies which conflict with the federal antitrust
laws do not necessarily prevail over the antitrust laws. Rather, the
courts attempt to harmonize the two inconsistent standards. This at-
tempt involves a balancing of the conflicting interests. There is no
reason, declares the majority, that state regulatory agencies should
be given a broader grant of power than federal agencies. Automatic
subordination of federal antitrust laws to conflicting state regulations
basis upon which the Court may create a future exemption. 428 U.S. at 592-95.
It is not dependent upon any other factor which the Court develops.
93. 428 U.S. at 595.
94. Id. at 596.
would acknowledge a state preemption dectrine more potent than
the federal preemption doctrine.9 5 However, cases construing the
commerce clause preclude a more potent state preemption rule.
Therefore, the Court states that if federal agencies must have their
regulations balanced against conflicting antitrust standards, the state
regulations must be subject to a test at least as strict.
Integral to the federal immunity test is that there can be no
exemption unless necessary to make the regulatory policy work "and
even then only to the minimum extent necessary." 96 This requirement
is employed in federal action cases to indicate that while the regulation
may be as broad as is permissible, the exemption will only apply to
that portion necessary to make it work. This factor was never part
of the traditional Parker doctrine. In a general sense, the minimum
extent analysis relates to the third factor under Parker, that the enabl-
ing legislation must show a clear purpose to displace the antitrust laws;
courts would sometimes exempt on the basis of only a clear statutory
purpose.
However, under the prospective Cantor formula, the traditional
Parker factor would be woefully inadequate. An explicit intent to dis-
place the federal antitrust laws would be meaningless because the state
does not possess the power to preempt, at will, federal legislation.
Instead, the state statute and interest in regulation would be balanced
against the federal antitrust interest in preserving open competition.
Additionally, even if the balance weighs in favor of the state regulatory
policy, the exemption will only be granted to the minimum extent
necessary to ensure that the regulatory program can operate.
Under the traditional Parker analysis, a private party was exempt
so long as it satisfied the courts that there was state action. The courts
never separately considered whether the contested policy was valid
in respect to federal preemption questions before considering the issue
of a specific exemption for the private parties involved in the particular
case. Cantor has established a prospective framework that is signifi-
cantly different from the Parker state action doctrine. Under the
Cantor approach, the courts can separately decide whether the state
regulatory program is valid on a preemption basis. For this deter-
mination they may employ a balancing of interests as in the federal
immunity test. If the courts should invalidate the regulatory program,
95. Id. at 596-97. The Court in Cantor reinforces this notion that the state
preemption doctrine can be no greater than the federal preemption. When some of
the courts in the traditional Parker cases only looked for the specific purpose in the
enabling legislation, they were granting exemptions to state regulatory statutes without
even considering the implicit questions of federal antitrust preemption. This approach
was giving the states a broader grant of authority to regulate than that which was
available to federal agencies.
96. 428 U.S. at 597.
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then the private party does not need to follow future state mandates
but can instead obey the antitrust laws and avoid liability. If the
courts should uphold the state program, then the private party must
conform to the state regulations, and there will be no future antitrust
liability. As to the question of past liability arising prior to the de-
termination concerning the validity of the statute, the courts must
separately consider the state compulsion rationale. If a court should
decide to exempt, it must exempt only to the minimum extent necessary
to make the statute operate.
Finally, in the discussion of the congressional intent rationale, the
Court declares yet another reason why an exemption should not be
created for Detroit Edison. Even if Congress did not intend to apply
the antitrust laws to areas of the economy already regulated by the
state, the application of the antitrust laws to an essentially unregulated
area of the economy would still not be prohibited. In Cantor, the
state had a regulatory policy toward electricity consumption, not to
the distribution of light bulbs. As a result, there was no state regu-
latory policy with which to contrast the antitrust laws. In that situa-
tion, the Court concludes that the state interest in regulating electrical
consumption will not be impaired by the application of the federal
standards to distribution of light bulbs.9 7
What has the Court accomplished in section III? After eliminat-
ing the umbrella immunity of Parker in section II, the Court in section
III has presented reasons that might justify the creation of a new
exemption but rejects them on the basis of the specific facts in Cantor.
In determining whether a state regulatory policy will exempt
private parties there are several considerations. First, if the private
party is participating in a sector of the economy that is not regulated,
the antitrust laws may apply. Second, if the private party is acting
within a regulated segment of the economy, then the courts must de-
termine whether the regulatory scheme conflicts with the antitrust
laws. If there is an inconsistency, the courts should balance the com-
peting interests. If the balance falls in favor of the state, the courts
should imply a congressional intent to exempt the activity from opera-
tion of the federal antitrust laws to the minimum extent necessary to
make the scheme work.
Furthermore, if the role of the state is so dominant in the decision-
making and the implementation segments of the regulatory scheme
that it would be unfair to hold the private party liable, then the activity
will be exempted. This rationale for an exemption will apply even
if the court should invalidate the regulatory scheme on the basis of
balancing state interests versus the antitrust laws. If the scheme is
97. Id. at 598.
improper because of the antitrust law's preemption but the court finds
that the state compelled a private party to act in an anticompetitive
way, the private party may still be exempted from liability.
98
Rationales for an Exemption from Treble Damages
In section IV of the opinion,99 the plurality discusses whether
violations of the antitrust laws by regulated parties which may lead to
"massive treble damage liabilities" should justify an exemption from
treble damages. The plurality considers two reasons advanced in sup-
port of this position but rejects both arguments, deciding that regulated
private parties should be subject to the law of treble damages.
The first reason offered for treble damage immunity arises in cir-
cumstances where the chance of violating the antitrust laws is increased
as a result of the regulatory process. In Cantor the Court states that
the regulation merely approved the program; in no way did mere ap-
proval increase Detroit Edison's vulnerability, to antitrust liability.
Detroit Edison implemented the program prior to the establishment
of the Michigan regulatory commission, and the commission merely
allowed the utility to continue a program which the utility had de-
veloped and long conducted. The continuing regulatory approval by
the commission did not increase the liability which the utility faced
as a result of its own original action. 100
The second reason offered for treble damage immunity was re-
liance by the regulated party on an understanding that the contested
activity was exempt from antitrust liability. However, the Court
adopts a stem position on this point and firmly rejects the argument
when it states, "This Court has never sustained a claim that otherwise
unlawful private conduct is exempt from the antitrust laws because
it was permitted or required by state law."''1  Citing Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,'0 2 the Court holds that there is not an automatic
98. Dorman concludes that section III creates one test for future state action
cases involving regulated private parties. Dorman, supra note 25, at 513-16. As
discussed in the text, section III actually creates no test for a private party exemption.
The Court mentions that there are possible justifications for the creation of a new
exemption, but the Court explicitly rejects those justifications when analyzing the
specific facts in Cantor. Dorman has interpreted section III to mean that a new
exemption has already been created. Yet, the language used by the Court indicates
that no exemption will exist for private parties until and unless the Court decides to
create one in the future. All the Court provides in section III in relation to the issue
of the exemption are possible clues as to the approach the Court may adopt in a
forthcoming state action case.
99. 408 U.S. at 598-603.
100. Id. at 599-600.
101. Id. at 600.
102. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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exemption for compliance with any state regulation. The plurality
also cites Parker in its most restrictive portion, where Justice Stone
wrote, "[A] state does not give immunity to those who violated the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful ... "103 By these references, the Court clearly
warns regulated parties that there is no exemption from treble damages
on the basis of adherence to a state regulatory command. Though
in the past some lower courts had liberally interpreted the Parker
doctrine to grant such immunity, 04 the Cantor court indicates that
immunity will not be granted on such a basis in the future. Moreover,
in Cantor the Court utilizes the argument that even the private parties
in Parker may not have received an exemption if the issue had been
litigated:
[T]he narrow holding in Parker concerned only the legality of the
conduct of the state officials charged by law with the responsi-
bility for administering California's program. What sort of charge
might have been made against the various private persons who
engaged in a variety of different activities implementing that pro-
gram is unknown and unknowable because no such charges were
made. 0 5
Cantor is the first court openly to question whether Parker might
have split on the issue of liability, so as to exempt the state officials
yet hold the regulhted private growers liable. This statement by the
Cantor plurality reflects the same reasoning as in section II, in which
they confined the Parker decision to the issue of state liability.
The final portion of section IV gives some indication of the shape
of the prospective exemption if the Court creates a new doctrine in
the future. The Court states:
Although it is tempting to try to fashion a rule which would govern
the decision of the liability issue and the damage issue in all future
cases presenting state action issues, we believe the Court should
adhere to its settled policy of giving concrete meaning to the gen-
eral language of the Sherman Act by a process of case-by-case
adjudication of specific controversies.10 6
The only suggestion by the Court as to the nature of the prospective
exemption is, therefore, the references to the federal immunity test
in section III, a majority section.
Section IV is a negative portion of the opinion. In it the Court
rejects possible justifications for an immunity and does not establish
anything affirmative. The plurality considers two reasons which could
support a treble damage exemption for regulated parties but rejects
103. 317 U.S. at 351 (1942).
104. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
105. 428 U.S. at 601 (citation omitted).
106. Id. at 603.
both of them on the basis of the specific facts in Cantor. It appears
that one of the reasons might sustain an exemption on appropriate
facts in a future case; the Court leaves open the door to proof that a
private party's vulnerability to antitrust liability was increased by
obedience to state regulation. However, the second reason seems re-
jected out of hand. The Court states it will not exempt from liability
even upon proof that the regulated party was led to believe its conduct
was immune from antitrust liability.107
The Concurring Opinions
Chief Justice Burger concurs in the judgment and in parts I and
III of the opinion. In his separate opinion he contends that Parker
cannot "logically be limited to suits against state officials."'o 8  Predi-
cating his decision upon the applicability of Parker, he notes that the
Michigan commission lacked independent regulatory control, that light
bulb distribution is an "ancillary" practice of the utility, and that the
commission adopted a "neutral" position. Chief Justice Burger ap-
provingly cites section III of the opinion in support of his reasoning. 10 9
As is evident from the Chief Justice's holding, he is basing his opinion
upon traditional Parker case law. As far as he is concerned, Parker
still covers both the state and the regulated private parties. However,
in Cantor he does not grant the exemption because there is no active
regulation or compulsion.
Because he joined in section III, the Chief Justice apparently in-
terprets that section as deciding the case through a traditional Parker
analysis. Such an interpretation views the four sections of Cantor as
inherently contradictory. Under this interpretation, section II is an
attempt by the plurality to overrule one-half of the scope of the Parker
doctrine. Chief Justice Burger refuses to join in this confinement of
Parker. Part III talks in terms of two justifications which have always
been the underlying rationales used by lower courts when applying
the Parker exemption. The Court rejects these justifications based on
the facts of Cantor. Instead of viewing the Court's discussion in Part
III as the creation of a new Cantor exemption, Chief Justice Burger
views this section as an application of traditional Parker doctrine.
107. Dorman speculates that a treble damage immunity has been created, as of
Cantor, to apply in certain limited cases. Dorman, supra note 25, at 518-19. Sec-
tion IV does utilize language which indicates that the first justification which is dis-
cussed (whether the hazards of antitrust liability were enhanced by the regulatory
process) might justify treble damage immunity if the correct set of facts ever arose.
However, the Court rejects such an immunity on the basis of the Cantor facts, and
the Court did not create a treble damage immunity precedent that would bind it in
future cases.
108. 428 U.S. at 603-04.
109. Id. at 604.
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Thus the Chief Justice apparently does not believe that he joins in the
creation of a prospective Cantor exemption in that he has refused to
join in the confinement of Parker. He interprets the state compul-
sion and congressional intent discussions as the old factors of Parker.
Hence, the Court's holding in section III satisfies Burger who bases
his decision upon Parker analysis.
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence raises two questions. First,
why did Burger concur with the federal immunity and minimum extent
analysis in section III? Second, why did he disagree with section IV?
In relation to the language in section III, there are two possible
explanations. First, the Chief Justice might believe, as the Court
stated, that these factors resembling federal immunity and minimum
extent analysis had always been an integral part of the state action
test. However, this analysis is incorrect as discussed under the state
action test above." 0 Second, he might interpret this language as stiff-
ening the showing of the specific intent of the enabling legislation,
one of the former Parker factors. This view is also wrong, because
if the intent factor of Parker were rigidified into the federal immunity
test and the minimum extent analysis, it would cease to be a factor
and would instead become an independent rule.
The Chief Justice considers section III as the one in which the
Court decides the case; as previously discussed, the Court decided the
case in section II when it confined Parker. Section III has no effect
on the outcome of Cantor, but it is a vehicle for charting a new path
to replace Parker.
In contrast Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion appears
to have only minor differences with the plurality. One of his major
purposes in writing a separate opinion is to explain in greater detail
the reasons for adoption of a federal balancing test and to advocate
that it should be adopted in the Cantor decision and not postponed
as the plurality has done.
Justice Blackmun begins by stating that state laws which achieve
results which are inconsistent with the federal antitrust laws are pre-
empted. He cites Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp."'
and Northern Securities v. United States 12 for the proposition that
inconsistent state laws in those cases were preempted by the Sherman
Act. Blackmuns argument on this point is summarized as follows:
[S]ome degree of state-law pre-emption is implicit in the most
fundamental operation of the Sherman Act .... [T]here has
never been any doubt that if [state-sanctioned anticompetitive]
combinations offend the Sherman Act, they are illegal, and state
110. See text accompanying notes 5-27 supra.
111. 428 U.S. at 606 (citing 341 U.S. 384 (1951)).
112. 428 U.S. at 606 (citing 193 U.S. 197 (1904)).
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laws to that extent are overriden. Congress itself has given sup-
port to the view that inconsistent state laws are pre-empted by the
Sherman Act.113
Justice Blackmun views the difficult issue to be determining which
laws are inconsistent and, of those, which are to be preempted in total
or in part. To decide these issues he advocates a balancing approach
which parallels that utilized by federal courts in antitrust immunity
cases:
I would apply at least for now, a rule of reason, taking it
as a general proposition that state-sanctioned anticompetitive ac-
tivity must fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its
benefits ....
. . . The balancing of harm and benefit is, in general, a proc-
ess with which federal courts are well acquainted .... "I
This approach is essentially the process which federal courts con-
sider when balancing the harms and benefits of a federal regulation
against those of the antitrust laws. Blackmun does not talk in terms
of the "minimum extent necessary," and therefore it is not discernible
whether he favors adoption of all of the federal immunity formula or
whether he just advocates a straight balancing approach. Applying
his balancing test to the facts in Cantor, Blackmun decides that the
potential harms of the utility's tie-in arrangement far outweigh the
possible benefits.
1 5
Justice Blackmun does not join section II and the confinement of
Parker because, as he states in a footnote, he believes that the contested
activity in Parker was valid and would have created an exemption for
the private growers if they had been sued.' 16 One way to recognize
a Parker exemption for both the state and private parties and simul-
taneously advocate a balancing approach for state action cases is to
consider the balancing test a fifth and controlling factor in the state
action test. For instance, a court would still have to go through the
traditional Parker analysis to decide if there was state action. If the
four Parker factors were not satisfied, there would be no exemption
and no reason to balance the competing interests. If the four factors
were satisfied, however, Blackmun would then proceed to balance
the interests and conceivably would deny the exemption despite the
presence of traditional Parker state action.
Both Blackmun and the plurality reach the same result; both de-
mand that the balance of competing interests justify the exemption.
113. 428 U.S. at 607.
114. Id. at 610-12.
115. Id. at 612.
116. Id. at 613-14 n.5.
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However, Blackmun would first consider the four Parker factors,
whereas the plurality discards Parker entirely in the context of private
parties.
Justice Blackmun agrees with the state compulsion rationale as
explained by the Court in the beginning of section III. Because
Blackmun advocates the establishment of an exemption as of Cantor
from treble damages for private parties who act under state mandate,
he dissents from section IV. n 7' The plurality refused to create such
treble damage immunity on the basis of the facts of Cantor.
Thus, the concurring opinions complicate an already .difficult
opinion. The Chief Justice concurs in the judgment; for the wrong
reasons he joins in a section which has no effect on the eventual de-
cision. Justice Blackmun advocates the immediate adoption of both
a balancing approach and a limited treble damage exemption. The
plurality considers the adoption of these two approaches to be pre-
mature based upon the Cantor facts. Blackmun, however, reaches the
result under Parker."8
117. Id. at 614 n.6.
118. Dorman concludes that Justice Blackmun and the plurality are advocating
significantly different approaches to the state action issue. Dorman, supra note 25,
at 520. However, it appears that Justice Blackmun and the plurality have only minor
philosophical disagreements and that Blackmun will be the fifth majority vote for
the plurality's positions in future state action cases.
The Court has had its first opportunity since Cantor to comment upon the state
action exemption in its decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
In Bates the Court was faced with alleged Sherman Act and first amendment violations
as the result of a prohibition of advertising by attorneys. The state supreme court
as part of its regulation of the Arizona Bar had imposed and enforced the advertising
prohibition.
On the first amendment issue, Justice Blackmun authored a majority of five jus-
tices who hold that commercial speech, which serves individual and societal interests
in assuring informed decisionmaking, is entitled to limited first amendment protection.
However, on the Sherman Act issue, the decision was unanimous as all the jus-
tices agree that the activity of the Arizona Bar and the state supreme court consti-
tuted state action that was exempt under Parker. The Court distinguishes both Cantor
and Goldfarb from the situation in Bates.
The Bates court notes that there had only been state authorization and not com-
pulsion in Goldfarb. In the facts of Bates, the Court states that the prohibition on
advertising, coupled with a disciplinary rule is a restraint "compelled by direction of
the State acting as sovereign." 97 S.Ct. 2697 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).
In relation to Cantor, the Court draws three distinctions. First, the Court states
that the context in which Cantor arose is critical. The Bates Court says that Cantor
would have been an entirely different case if the state had been sued, instead of a
regulated private party. 97 S.Ct. at 2697. The Court then proceeds to note that the
instant suit is against the Arizona Supreme Court and hence against the state itself.
Second, the Court emphasizes that there was no legitimate state interest in the
The Rationale for the Confinement of Parker
A lingering question concerning Cantor is why the Court adopted
a significant departure from Parker. The most likely answer is that
the Supreme Court decided that the Parker exemption had become
a confused doctrine as a result of numerous interpretive cases which
had often assumed contradictory stances while simultaneously failing
to utilize any established formula or test. The judicial test of state
action was so nebulous as to constitute no test in fact. In essence, the
Court in Cantor decided that it was time for a judicial house cleaning
of the state action exemption. However, because of the muddled
status of the Parker doctrine, the Court decided to talk in terms of a
totally new exemption as opposed to a mere modification of Parker.
If the Court modified Parker, the lower courts would still be working
with thirty-three years of state action case law in addition to the pro-
nouncements in Cantor. Instead, the Cantor court confined Parker
and in this way cleared the slate on regulated private parties. If and
regulation of light bulbs in Cantor. In contrast, in Bates, the regulation is "at the
core of the State's power to protect the public." 97 S.Ct. at 2697-98.
Finally, the Court says that the regulatory program in Cantor was initiated by
the private utility and that the state commission had merely authorized its continued
utilization. However, in Bates the Court states that the initiative for the regulatory
program came from the state. Also the Court notes that the advertising rules are
subject to constant re-examniation by the Arizona Supreme Court. The Court con-
cludes, "Our concern that federal policy is being unnecessarily and inappropriately
subordinated to state policy is reduced in such a situation ..... " 97 S.Ct. at 2698.
Despite the three distinctions which the Court draws, Bates is not an illuminating
decision upon the status of the state action exemption after Cantor. The appellants
in Bates had contended that the federal interest in the antitrust laws should outweigh
the state interests in prohibiting advertisements by attorneys. Moreover, the appel-
ants argued that the regulation was not formulated so as to intrude upon the federal
interest to the minimum extent necessary. While Justice Blackmun notes the existence
of these arguments, he does not proceed to discuss them. It is not clear whether the
Court is implicitly utilizing an approach similar to the federal immunity test or whether
it is using an unannounced balancing test when considering the conflicting interests.
In Cantor the Court appeared concerned with the creation of rules that would
apply in future cases. In Bates the Court seems to be strictly concerned with a de-
cision upon the facts of the case, and there is no language which creates or modifies
the rules of the state action exemption.
In summary, an initial analysis shows that by distinguishing Cantor, instead of
dealing with it directly, the Court has not clarified the status of the state action
exemption.
It is important to note that there are two cases which will afford an opportunity
for the Court to deal specifically with Cantor in the near future. Boddicker v. Arizona
State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977), application for cert. filed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3779 (May 23, 1977); Lafayette, Louisiana v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 430 U.S. 944 (1977). Both of these
cases are concerned with state action issues, and Cantor may be the key element in
their ultimate disposition.
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when the Court decides to create such an exemption, it will be able
to do so on its own distinct terms and without the accompanying
confusion of Parker.
An additional reason for the Court's approach is evidenced in
section III. In that portion, the Court separated the discussion of
the private party exemption, that is, the state compulsion rationale,
from the congressional intent discussion which led into the issues of
federal preemption. As discussed above these factors are independent
and should be so considered by the courts. The only intermingling
is that the minimum extent analysis limits the exemption to the mini-
mum extent necessary to make the program work. Under Parker the
courts had often confused the two distinct issues; they were often
intermingled under the factor that analyzed the intent of the enabling
legislation. Even in Parker itself the Court had freely interchanged
antitrust exemption issues with the commerce clause discussion. Be-
cause of Parker's long standing confusion of these issues, the Cantor
court decided it was advantageous to pursue a new judicial approach
where it could clearly draw the distinction between these important
issues.
Conclusion
Because section II, the confinement of Parker, did not receive a
majority vote, the lower courts are left in a confusing middle position.
Technically, the traditional Parker doctrine remains valid, yet language
resembling the federal immunity test and the minimum extent analysis
received majority votes. The clear trend of the Court, especially in
light of Blackmun's concurrence, is the confinement of Parker to state
activity.
In the future a case will present itself with a fact situation which
will justify the application of an exemption which is either the result
of the state compulsion or congressional intent rationales. At that
point, the prospective exemption for private parties which was created
in Cantor will be put into practice as a respected exception to the
federal antitrust laws.
Until that case presents itself, the antitrust bar is left with a strong
indication by the Court as to the trend it intends to pursue in the
granting of any future exemptions. Additionally, the Court has in-
stituted the federal immunity approach, coupled with the minimum
extent analysis, whenever the judiciary considers the issue of the va-
lidity of a state regulatory program in light of federal antitrust pre-
emption questions. The conclusions concerning the immediate and
prospective changes that have been wrought into the state action
exemption are predicated upon a detailed analysis of both Parker and
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Cantor. The trend appears to be toward a state action exemption
which is narrowly drawn and which strongly resembles the tests
utilized by federal courts in federal action cases.
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